# Ethnic Korean Migration In Northeast Asia

Jeanyoung Lee

ETHNIC KOREAN MIGRATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA


Jeanyoung Lee


Kyunghee University


Historical Backgrounds of the Korean Migration


There are more than 5.65 million overseas Koreans (Chaewoe tongpo) in the world. Ninety -three percent of them are found in Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. In this paper we will discuss the ethnic Koreans in China and in the former Soviet Union. We know there are 2 million ethnic Koreans (Chosonjok ) in China and half million ethnic Koreans (Koryojin) in the former Soviet Union. The host countries treat them as their own nationals. Therefore, it is important to examine the historical development of the Korean communities in China and Russia before the 1990s.


Table 1. Overseas Koreans in the Big Four Countries


1991 1992 1995 1997 1999 Percentage

China 1,922,097 1,927,278 1,940,398 1,985,503 2,043,578 36.20

Japan 730,091 712,519 696,811 702,967 660,214 11.70

U.S.A. 1,452,149 1,553,577 1,801,684 2,000,431 2,057,546 36.45

CIS NA NA 461,145 450,104 486,857 8.63

Note: The figures include the Korean nationals who are working or studying in these countries.


Source: Ministry of Justice, Chaewoe Tongpo Hyonhwang (Number of overseas Koreans), Seoul: Ministry of Justice, 1999.


Koreans in China (Chosonjok)


The history of the Korean community in China can be divided into three periods: embryonic (1896-1910), refugee (1910-1931), and immigrant (1931-1945). However, there were major changes to the community as a result of three historical incidents: (1) Japans surrender in 1945 and the subsequent return of Koreans in Japan and elsewhere to the Korean peninsula between 1945-1948, (2) the Chinese Civil War in Manchuria between the Communists and the Republicans and the enlistment of Koreans in the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in Manchuria between 1945-1949, and (3) the Korean War between 1950-1953, which prompted a massive exodus of Koreans, including interpreters and nurses, into North Korea to support the PLA.


Although a quarter of the two million Koreans overseas returned to Korea after the Second World War,1 and many Koreans from Manchuria were killed in war, the distribution of Koreans remained unchanged. Therefore, it is important to examine the development of Korean communities abroad prior to the Second World War.


The migration of Koreans to Manchuria began around the end of the seventeenth century. At that time, Chinas Ming dynasty (1368-1644) was dissolved and the Manchu Qing dynasty became the principal power in Manchuria and in China proper.2 The pattern of Korean migration into China was seasonal. The Qing court had prohibited any ethnic groups other than the Manchus from entering Manchuria and had agreed, in a treaty with Choson, to repatriate Koreans who had migrated to Manchuria.3


The Choson court also wanted to prevent Koreans from moving to Manchuria for fear of losing tax revenues and to ensure the safety of the border with China. The Chosun government beheaded convicted Korean immigrants when the Qing government transferred


118


them to their custody.4 However, in the middle of the nineteenth century, there was series of severe drought in the northern provinces of Chosun, forcing Korean farmers in the border area to immigrate to the forbidden territory. The Qing government reluctantly took in these immigrants to use them as a buffer against the growing Russian influence and to increase tax revenues.5


When the Qing government lifted the ban on immigration in 1875, Koreans were officially allowed to move to Manchuria. According to unofficial data, the Korean population in Manchuria was 34,000 in 1894. This increased to 73,000 in 1907, to 98,000 in 1909, and to 109,500 in 1910.6 When Japan annexed Korea in 1910, Japanese rule was very harsh. Through agricultural reforms, most of the farmland came under the control of the companies sponsored by the Japanese government. Japanese immigrants came to Korea as new owners of this land. As a result, Korean farmers who had lost their lands or the right to farm had to decide whether to work under the new landowners or to look for an alternative livelihood. Many farmers chose to leave rather than to work for the Japanese.7 The decision was reinforced by the relocation of centers of the Korean independence movement against Japan to Manchuria. Patriotic Korean fighters and intellectuals moved to Manchuria. By 1920, the Korean population had grown to 298,900.8 By 1930, it had reached 600,000. About 64 percent of them were in Gando, The people were mainly refugees or voluntary immigrants who had fled from the Japanese colonial rule in Korea.


After the Manchukuo government was established in 1931, there was a massive immigration of Koreans into Manchuria at the initiative of the Japanese. The Japanese government needed the Koreans to cultivate remote land in northern Manchuria and to create Japanised Manchuria. The Kwantung Army raised objections to this policy for strategic reasons, arguing that to conquer the entire region, more Japanese migrants were needed rather than Koreans.9 However, after the worldwide economic recession, the Japanese colonial government in Korea felt it necessary to send surplus Korean workers to Manchuria.


The migration of Koreans was conducted under an elaborate plan. The Colonial Office in Korea set up a scheme of volunteer bases and units.10 Under this scheme, each unit was allocated an area in Manchuria in which to settle. These migrant units were called the Frontier Group. Sometimes, a whole village from southern Korea was moved to Heilongjiang Province. Unlike the migration to Manchuria of earliest settlers, many of these Koreans were forcibly deported from Korea en masse, under the guise of voluntary migration. The villages where they settled were little more than concentration camps. At the center of each settlement was a Japanese police branch. There were fences and watchtowers to prevent the Koreans from escaping as well as to defend them against attack from the Communists.11 The massive migration of Korean peasants generated many inter-ethnic problems in Manchuria. Ethnic tensions increased between Koreans and Chinese and the Japanese Manchukuo government took advantage of this. However, as Japan occupied Manchuria, these problems were not evident to the outside world. The plan, however, was drastically curtailed when the Japanese army invaded China proper in 193712


After 1942, a shortage of workers in munitions factories forced Koreans to work in Japan. Men were conscripted into the Japanese army as soldiers and sent to the war-front and women were forced to work as comfort women (wianbu) for the Japanese Army. The migrant settlements were dismantled and runaway Korean soldiers were dispersed to China proper.


119


When the war ended in Manchuria, 2,163,515 Koreans remained there. However, the pattern of settlement had not greatly changed.13 The Korean people in Manchuria were mainly concentrated in two areas: Dongbiandao and Gando (Jiandao in Chinese, present-day Yanbian). Dongbiandao was across the Yalu River from the Korean border, and consisted of twenty counties. Gando was adjacent to the Tumen River.


Koreans in the Former Soviet Union (Koryoin)


Korean immigrants in Russia officially started after the Treaty of Peking (1860) when Russia became a neighbor of Korea. But, the Koreans had already moved into the Maritime Region as the land was under Qing control and forbidden for Korean migrants.14 They were also seasonal, irregular, and illegal migrants. The number of settlers reached 100 families in 1866. As a bad drought came in 1869, the Korean population jumped to 8,400 people. The Koreans crossed the Tumen River on the Korean-Russian border but also on the Russian-Manchuria border. By 1923, the number of Korean immigrants had exceeded 100,000 and by 1927 their number had reached 170,000. During the 1920s, however, the Korean population in the Russian Far East had reached an estimated 250,000.15 The motivation of the Korean immigration to Russia at that time was the same as that of the Korean migrants in Manchuria, to escape hunger and the Japanese rule in Korea.


The attitudes of the local Russians towards the Korean immigrants ranged from one of welcoming them for the cheap laborers they needed in the development of the area, to one of concern about the potential vulnerability to the advance of Koreans along the strategic coast of the Pacific Ocean.16 The Russian authorities registered Korean immigrants and started to permit them to obtain Russian citizenship.17 By 1914, a third of the Korean immigrants had become Russian citizens. Unlike in Manchuria, there were visible signs of successful assimilation of Koreans into the Russian communities. Many were converted to the Orthodox Church and Russified their names.

The October Revolution in 1917 brought great changes to the Koreans in Russia. Because most of the Korean activists were engaged in the anti-Japanese struggle, few Koreans were available to join the Bolsheviks.18 But, the Japanese intervention in Siberia and the Far East from 1918 to 1922, followed by the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic as a buffer state, prompted the Korean partisans to join the Bolsheviks in the fight against the Entente intervention.19 Following the establishment of the Soviet Union, therefore, Koreans in the country were permitted to become Soviet citizens and sovietization started in the Korean regions.

The sovietization of the Koreans was completed in the 1920. An important incident during this period was that the Koreans sent a petition for the establishment of a Far Eastern Korean Peoples Republic to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The move was influenced by the decision of the Soviet government to form the Jewish Autonomous Republic in Birobidzhan. The petition was denied in 1929.20 Along with the petition, some Korean farmers protested and clashed with Russians over the fact that the Russian collective farms got more land and were better provided with agricultural machinery. The Soviet local government was also alarmed by the waves of Korean and Chinese migrants into the Soviet Far East.21


Stalins forcible transfer of Koreans along with other ethnic minorities, including Germans and Chinese, began in the early 1930s. These minorities were mainly classified as he enemies of the class and sent to the gulag, the labor camp.22 It was not until 1936 that


120


the scale of Koreans to Central Asia became massive. At least, 118,000 Koreans were forced to move to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. By 1939, the number of Koreans in Central Asia had reached 182,300. Before the transfer, the Soviet government executed more than 2,500 Korean Communists, mostly leaders of the Korean community in the Far East.23 The reason for the forced migration of Koreans was political; the Soviet Union felt threatened by the aggressive policy of Japan in China, particularly in Manchuria. Nor did the Soviet government trust the Koreans in the Far East.


Thus, Koreans in the former Soviet Union lived in various republics until the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1989, the number of Koreans was 438,650 in fifteen republics.24 Yet, the proportion of the Koreans in these republics did not reach 1 percent of the total local population. They were truly ethnic minorities wherever they were, and their Russification was particularly fast in Central Asia.


Migration of Ethnic Koreans to South Korea since the 1990s


Normalization of South Korea with the former Soviet Union and China resulted in a massive migration of ethnic Koreans in Northeast Asia. Although they are ethnic Korean migrants, the migrants from the two countries include deserters from North Korea (Talbukja), who are strangers to present day South Korea. Here, the Korean society is being tested in the notion of ethnicity, nation, nationalism, and human rights. South Korea is also facing the issue of migrant workers (Woegukin nodongja), mainly from South and Southeast Asia. The two issues are now on South Koreas social and political agenda.


For the purpose of this analysis, migration flows in and around South Korea, including ethnic Koreans, can be divided into 14 groups as shown in Table 2 below. The three ethnic Korean groups, i.e., Groups 1, 9, and 13, and foreign workers are directly related to South Korea. In terms of Korean societys reaction toward these groups, the question of Chinese of Korean ethnicity (Chosonjok) is of the utmost importance. The groups are differentiated from each another by two axes of coordinates-ethnicity and nationality. Chosonjok and Koryoin are related to both axes while foreign workers are aliens. Talbukja are a unique case because they are regarded as nationals of the Republic of Korea.


Table. 2. Ethnic Korean Migration: Groups and Origins


Name of Group Koreans in China Koreans in the former North Korean deserters Foreign workers

(Chosonjok) Soviet Union (Talbukja) (Woegukin

(Koryoin) nodongja)

Origin Northeast China Russia North Korea Southeast Asia

Kazakhstan South Asia

Uzbekistan Africa

Sakhalin Russia

Destination 1. South Korea 7. Russian Far East 10. Northeast China 14. South

2. Japan 8. Russia 11. China proper Korea

3. Russian Far East 9. South Korea 12. Russia

4. United States 13. South Korea

5. Europe

6. China proper


In this paper, we will look at groups 1, 9, and 13 and Korean societys reaction towards them. In the case of Chosonjok, around 150,000 Korean Chinese are reported to be living (legally or illegally) in South Korea in 2001. Another main destination of Korean Chinese migrants is China proper (guannei), in the coastal cities, where South Korean firms


121


are running their business. They are working as interpreters, housemaids, guides, and local representatives of Korean firms. Also, some Korean Chinese are working as shuttle traders (botarijangsu) in the Russian Far East. They are mainly seasonal migrants, but some of them have settled in market areas of Russian Far Eastern cities. However, these two groups, as well as the small number of Korean Chinese who are now working in Western countries, are excluded from the present discussion.


Migration of ethnic Koreans in the former Soviet Union to South Korea is relatively rare. The South Korean government has accepted into the country a small number of Koreans from Sakhalin, where they have no citizenship. Those Koreans were forced to move to Sakhalin before the Second World War when the island that was Japanese territory, and worked mainly as mine workers. Some of them have decided to return to Sakhalin to live with their families (Table 3). Ethnic Koreans in Central Asian countries are being moved again because of the emergence of nationalism in those countries. Initially, they were forced to move from the Far East in 1933 and scattered in such republics as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, and Tajikistan. Now, they are moving back to Russia, especially to Moscow, Volgograd, and the Far East. Most of them are not moving to South Korea because, in addition to economic reasons, they cannot use the Korean language due to the Russification they had undergone. Therefore, the number of Koryoin in South Korea is very small.


Table 3. Re-migration of Ethnic Koreans in Sakhalin as of 1998


Destination Japan Russia North Korea Remaining in South Re-turning to

Sakhalin Korea Sakhalin from South

Total Korea

170,000 102,000 10,000 1,000 43,000 503 145

Source: National Intelligence Service of the Republic of Korea (http://www.nis.go.kr)


In addition, South Koreans have had to cope with an influx of deserters from North Korea since the rapid deterioration of the North Korean economic situation in the 1990s. As of 2001, 401 new comers are reported to have come to South Korea.25 The number of Talbukja has increased since 1994. In 1999, the annual number of new arrivals in the country reached more than one hundred. From 2000, the number has doubled. Now, around 1,600 Talbukja are known to live in South Korea. Although the number of Talbukja may be considered negligible, their presence in South Korea presents complex constitutional, political, social, and diplomatic issues.


Table 4. The Number of Talbukja in South Korea as of November 1999


Total Present in South Korea Deceased or Re-immigrated

1,050 836 214

Source: National Intelligence Service of the Republic of Korea.


Table 5. Annual Number of Talbukja arriving in South Korea


Year 1948- 60-69 70-79 80-89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

Total 59


1,050 275 210 59 63 9 9 8 8 52 41 56 85 71 104

Source: National Intelligence Service of the Republic of Korea


122


Along with the ethnic Korean migration, foreign migrant workers have appeared in the Korean labor market since 1991. In 2000, over 172,000 legal migrant workers from Asian countries were registered as aliens.


Table 6. Registered Aliens from some Asian Countries in 2000


Total Registered Aliens 172,000

Chosonjok 22,000

Non-Korean Chinese 26,500

Indonesians 16,700

Filipinos 16,000

Vietnamese 15,500

Bangladesh 7,900

Pakistanis 3,200

Thais 3,200

Srilankans 2,500

Nepalese 2,000

Myanmar 800

Source: Ministry of Justice, Chulibguk Tonggye (Annual Immigration Statistics), 2000.


There were also 5,100 migrants from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, about half of them believed to be Goryoin. In addition, the Korean government estimated that more than 143,000 people from Asia were illegally staying in South Korea in 2000. These made up 76 percent of the 189,000 illegal sojourners in the country. But the government estimate seemed too conservative. Some estimated the total number of illegal workers could be as large as 300,000. About half of them were believed to be Chosonjok. In addition, there were 22,000 legally registered Chosonjok. In fact, on the Full Moon Day in October, the most celebrated ethnic anniversary in the Korean calendar, most newspapers indicated that the number of Chosonjok in South Korea reached 200,000, including 50,000 who gathered in a Seoul stadium for celebration.26


In conclusion, among the many migrant groups in South Korea, around 200,000 Chosonjok are the largest. They are followed by 1,600 Talbukja and 25,000 Koryoin. The presence of foreign workers poses a different question to Korean society. Most of them can be identified easily by their racial features and language proficiency, because Korea is one of the most racially homogenous societies in the world. Moreover, Korean attitudes towards them are a part of comparative studies of international migration. The Korean governments policy towards ethnic Korean migrants, such as Chosonjok, Talbukja and Koryoin, shares some of the problems associated with its policy toward foreign workers. In addition, it poses important challenges to the Korean understanding of the Korean nation, Korean nationals, and overseas Koreans, as well as related issues of law and policy in South Korea.


The main task of this article is to identify the issues regarding the ethnic Korean migrants in South Korea. Therefore, issues of non -Korean foreign workers will be excluded from the present discussion unless they are related to the ethnic Korean migrants. Problems related to the ethnic Korean migration into South Korea can be divided into two parts;


Talbukja as a part of Korean nationals (Hanguk kukmin) and Chosonjok and Koryoin as a part of overseas Koreans (Chaeoe tongpo).


123


Issues Related to the Talbukja


The question of Talbukja is an indicator of the legal, political, societal and even conceptual discrepancies of the South Korean society. According to the countrys constitution, all North Koreans are nationals of the Republic of Korea. Article 3 of the constitution declares, The territory of the Republic of Korea consists of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands. The Nationality Act reiterates this point. The declaration remains unchanged even though North and South Korea became members of the United Nations in 1991 as two separate independent states.27 Therefore, the Talbukja question raises difficulties between the de jure declaration and de facto policy of South Korea. Beyond the human rights question of the Talbukja, several questions should be discussed-(1) the question of equality, 2) the diplomatic question regarding the status of the Talbukja in northeast China, 3) the legal question regarding the definition of Korean nationals, and 4) the question of settlement, i.e., control and adjustment of the Talbukja in Korean society.


The Equality Question: Selective Admission


Until the 1980s, most Talbukja came to South Korea across the heavily militarized demilitarized zone, in fact a quasi-frontier between North and South. But, in the 1990s, Talbukja crossed the northern borders of North Korea into China and Russia where some parts of the Tuman River are shallow and narrow (less than 100 meters in width). According to Table 4 and 5 above, a total of 1,050 North Koreans settled in South Korea during the period between the birth of South Korea and 1999. Even with the rapid increase in 2000 and 2001, the number of Talbukja who are now settled in South Korea does not exceed 1,600. Yet, many non -governmental organizations estimate that the number of North Koreans who are wandering around in northeast China, the Russian Far East, and even in Inner Mongolia reached no less than 100,000 as of 1999.28 Meanwhile, the South Korean government insisted that the figure in 1999 was about 30,000. Whatever the estimates are correct or not, these numbers are far more than the North Koreans who have settled in South Korea. It is obvious that the South Korean government has maintained a selective policy to limit the entry of the Talbukja into South Korea.


What are the reasons for this selective policy? These can be categorized into domestic political reasons, inter-Korean relations, and diplomatic disputes. First, the South Korean government accepted Talbukja to show off South Koreas supremacy over the North, particularly until 1980s. Until 1993, the government allowed Talbukja to come into South Korea as a reward for freedom fighters. The opposition parties criticized the government for diverting peoples attention from internal political problems to the issue that gave rise to the popular feeling of brotherhood among the Korean nation. The case of Hwang Jangyup, the architect of North Koreas Juche ideology and advisor to Kim Jung-il is believed to have changed the political atmosphere of South Korea at the time of his defection to South Korea through China and the Philippines. The change in popular mood was particularly visible at election times. The selective acceptance of former North Korean officials, diplomats, trade and foreign functionaries, intellectuals, and artists can be viewed in the same light.


Secondly, inter-Korean relations have influenced the development of South Koreas policy regarding Talbukja in the country. North-South relations improved after the conclusion of the Basic Agreement for Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation between North and South (the South-North Basic Agreement for short) in


124


1992 and, particularly, after the commencement of the Sunshine Policy by the Kim Dae-jung government. As Talbukja have been defined as traitors of the fatherland, the North Korean government has appealed to the South not to intervene in their internal affairs. The South Korean government has demonstrated sensitivity to this issue by adopting a cautious approach to the Talbukja.


South Koreas effort to avoid diplomatic disputes with other countries, such as Russia and China, is a third reason for its selective admission of Talbukja . The Seoul government finds it impracticable to extend its diplomatic protection for North Koreans in northeast China and the Russian Far East, because these countries recognize North Korea as an independent state. A constitutional question arises if South Korean diplomatic representatives refuse to accept North Koreans who insist they are South Korean nationals according to South Koreas constitution. This is related to the question of the status of the Talbukja discussed below.


Faced with the possibility of diplomatic disputes with North Korea, Russia, and China, and cognizant of the desire of Talbukja to settle in South Korea, with the support of South Korean NGOs, the South Korean government has adopted a selective method in deciding which North Koreans to admit into the country. The Act on Protection and Resettlement Assistance for Talbukja of 1997 was the result of the selective policy.29 The South Korean government announced that it would accept all Talbukja who expressed to South Korean diplomatic missions their desire to settle in South Korea, but in practice the government was selective in its admission decisions. According to the 1997 act, North Koreans in third countries may apply to South Korean embassies for protection. The Minister of National Unification or representatives of the minister review the application for protection and decide whether to grant the request. Here, protection means various forms of assistance until the North Korean applicants are fully settled in South Korea. The ministry can decline an application if it is likely to cause serious political or diplomatic difficulties for South Korea. The ministry can also deny entry of North Koreans if they have lived in a third country or countries for a substantial period. Although how long the substantial period would be is a subject to debate, the purpose of this stipulation is to refuse entry to the 20,000 Chogyo, the North Korean nationals who have lived in China since 1949. Different from Chosonjok, the Chinese nationals of Korean ethnicity, the Chogyo are believed to help North Korea to capture Talbukja in northeast China.


Not all North Koreans who are fleeing from North Korea and wandering in China and Russia wish to come to South Korea. Many move to and fro between China and North Korea to quell their hunger or make money by smuggling. Yet, the selective acceptance by South Korea has turned many North Koreans away and the number of Talbukja in the country is kept to a minimum. The increasing numbers of Talbukja settling in South Korea in 2000 and 2001evidently shows that the South Korean government has been more willing to accept more Talbukja into the country.


The Diplomatic Question: the Talbukja in Northeast China


The status of the Talbukja in foreign countries, particularly in China, has become an important question for South Korea. China, a traditional ally of North Korea, insists that its handling of North Korean defectors is a matter for its relations with North Korea, not South


125


Korea. The Chinese government has informed South Korea that it will settle the matter according to its domestic law and its agreements with North Korea.

Jilin Provinces Law on Border Control of 1993 provided for the prosecution of North Korean defectors and those who aid them. Yet, the legal punishment was minimized because the Central Government did not pay serious attention to the matter and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture took pity on the North Korean defectors who entered their territory to quell their hunger. Evidently, the Chinese governments, both central and provincial, viewed the North Korean defectors as transient migrants who needed help from their ethnic Korean relatives in Yanbian.


But the situation changed in 1997 when Kim Dae-jung was elected President. The new leader showed a new policy toward the overseas Koreans. This created a new atmosphere in dealing with the Talbukja as well. A dramatic increase of Talbukja due to the famine and flood in North Korea in 1997 stirred the South Korean public. Many NGOs organized numerous rallies and campaigns to support the North Korean defectors in China. Broadcasting companies released documentary films on the situation of the starving North Korean brethren. South Korea appealed to the international community with a reference to the human rights of the Talbukja. The representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Beijing argued that the Talbukja entering China should be treated as refugees who were fleeing from political persecution. Thus, the status of Talbukja became a serious diplomatic issue.30


The Chinese government was outraged by the remarks of the head of the Beijing Office of the UNHCR and made a public announcement on the matter. The Chinese government identified the Talbukja as temporary, transitory migrants, and illegal trespassers of Chinese territory. It argued that the treatment of the Talbukja is an internal matter of the Peoples Republic of China, as well as a bilateral matter with North Korea. The outcome was dramatic. Externally, the Chinese government marginalized the South Korean government on this matter. Moreover, many Talbukja who were captured by the Chinese authorities (gongan) were handed over to the North Korean security police who arrested their fleeing nationals on Chinese soil. Most of the captured Talbukja were executed or sent to prison camps in North Korea. Yet, the South Korean government could not do anything except to demand that the condition of the Talbukja should be improved. The Chinese government adopted a tougher policy toward those who aided the Talbukja. Beijing regarded accepting Talbukja into ones home as a crime and imposed a heavy fine on the aiding family. The fine charged was typically larger than the average annual salary of the individuals concerned. The Chinese government also added to the countrys criminal law a clause on the defiance of border control as a crime, targeted specifically against the Talbukja as well as those aiding them.


After the diplomatic dispute involving China, South Korea, and the UNHCR, it is said that the treatment of the Talbukja has improved. Earlier this year, for example, the Chinese government permitted a North Korean family who fled their country to go to South Korea via a third country. This can be seen as the Chinese governments implicit acknowledgement that some Talbukja are refugees.


Legal Questions: Korean Nationals?


The questions concerning the legal status of Talbukja are complex. They are related to the treatment of Chosonjok, who are Chinese nationals. Therefore, it is important to know


126


the degree to which South Korea recognizes the Chinese laws regarding the ethnic Koreans in China. Also relevant are the laws before the birth of South Korea. The South Korean government has not made a clear statement on this matter. However, a review of the cases related to the nationality law and administrative treatment of the Talbukja gives us some idea of the development in this area. Two case are noteworthy-the cases of Han Yeongsook and Yi Yeongsoon. The first is about a person who lived in China as a North Korean national (Chokyo) for a long time and later sought South Korean nationality. The latter relates to a woman who was born in Korea during Japanese rule and had lived in North Korea until she moved to China in 1960.


Han Yeongsook31 was born in China during Japanese rule in Manchuria, the present-day northeast China. Soon after her birth her family moved to Shanghai. In 1957, the Chinese government decided that the ethnic Koreans who were living in Northeast were identified as Chinese nationals (Chosonjok). But, those ethnic Koreans who were living south of Shanhaiguan, a traditional line between the Han Chinese and the barbarians, were classified as North Korean nationals (Chokyo).32 Under this rule, Han Yeongsook was treated as a foreigner and renewed her residency status every two years. Later she married a Chinese national, but retained her nationality. In the late 1980s, she found a job in a joint venture with a Korean company, Daewoo. With a Chinese passport, which she obtained through bribery, Han made a brief visit to South Korea on a travel certificate issued by the South Korean foreign ministry. Upon the expiration of her period of stay, however, she refused to return to China and requested the Ministry of Justice to ascertain her Korean nationality. She had also filed with the national residency registration and was given a national resident card. The district office, however, cancelled her residency registration because she had not submitted the required certificate of invalidation of her passport. What complicated her case was that she had used a forged Chinese passport. The only legitimate legal document she had was the travel certificate she had obtained from the South Korean foreign ministry. Han appealed the district offices decision, but the court ruled that the decision revoking her national residency status was valid. Hans appeal to the Supreme Court also failed. 33 Since only travel certificates were available to Chosonjok until 1992, the rule of the Supreme Court effectively blocked the claims of Chosonjok that they were ROK nationals on the basis of their settlement in South Korea. After Hans case, the government found a solution by expanding the scope of permanent resident returnees. Subsequently, Han was able to settle permanently in South Korea.


The case of Yi Yeongsoon relates to a decision on nationality before 1948. Yi Yeongsoon was born in Korea during Japanese rule and had lived in North Korea until she moved to China in 1960. Therefore, she was a North Korean national (Chokyo). She married a Chosonjok, and entered South Korea in 1992, but did so with a forged Chinese passport and a formal South Korean visa. She decided to settle permanently in South Korea. When she went the police, she initially identified herself as a North Korean. Yet the police regarded her as an illegal Chinese sojourner and handed her over to the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities issued a deportation order. She then claimed she was a national of the Republic of Korea ((as all North Korean nationals are nationals of the Republic of Korea according to the constitution of South Korea), arguing that she was born in North Korea, had lived there until 1960, and the North Korean embassy in China had issued a national identification card when she presented her alien resident card of China.34


127


The Seoul High Court ruled that Yi was a South Korean national and the deportation order should be revoked. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision.35


These cases above showed the South Korean governments position on the South Korean nationals. Here, all North Korean nationals are nationals of the Republic of Korea wherever they were and whether they enjoyed the citizenship of the republic or not.36 It is simply a matter of proof of North Korean nationals. But the main problem comes from the Chosonjok. Many Chosonjok insisted that they were North Korean nationals and that they lost their certificates while wandering around China. It is sometimes very difficult to determine whether an ethnic Korean is Talbukja, Chokyo or Chosonjok. Since 2000, illegal migrants from China by sea have included Chosonjok, Talbukja, and even Han Chinese. Therefore, the South Korean government treated the matter very cautiously. The case of Kim Yonghwa, still pending in the court, is an example. Without proper documentary proof, he insists that he is a Talbukja. The case is to test human rights in South Korea as well as the expansion of the nationality recovery procedure without material proof. Naturally, the nationality question of Talbukja is related to the question of Chosonjok.


The Settlement Question: Control and Adjustment in Korean Society


The treatment of Talbukja who are safely settled in South Korea is a social issue in South Korea. The issue can be divided into two parts: control and adjustment. When a Talbukja arrives in South Korea, the control procedure starts.37 The purpose of the investigation into the background of the individual and his/her motives to come to South Korea is to determine whether the person is indeed a Talbukja and has no links with the North Korean spy rings. If the individual is cleared, he/she undergoes a special program that lasts for three months to aid his/her adaptation in the South Korean society, followed by a job-training program. At this time, Hanawon, the only education center for defectors in South Korea, takes care of the new Talbukja. Also, the Talbukja receives special material support and a job guarantee when he/she starts a new life. The benefits the individual receives are far smaller than the real cost of living in South Korea. In 1999, the government increased the material benefit four times, to 27.6 million won (approximately $20,000), but removed the job guarantee. Regardless of the individuals place of residence, he/she is subject to monitoring by police. A police officer is assigned to each person for two years. The surveillance is mainly for protection against terrorist attacks by the North, but it also aims to monitor the persons behavior in general. In fact, there was a murder case by a former North Korean in South Korea after the individual was released from the surveillance. Therefore, the governments position seems to be in a dilemma between protection and control.


The most difficult problem that Talbukja face is finding a job and adapting to the new society. Because a job is no longer guaranteed and, despite the job-training program, many Talbukja are unable effectively to function in the new job if they find one, the unemployment rate among them is very high. It is believed that almost one-third of the Talbukja are jobless. More importantly, they are entering a peripheral part of Korean society, because most of them earn less than average Korean workers.38 Many social scientists, including medical psychologists, are critical of the present system of adaptation, which mainly focuses on explaining the South Korean society and giving job education.39 The critics argue that the focus of the program should be shifted to the problem of alienation of the Talbukja from both North and South Korean societies. From North Koreas perspective, the Talbukja have


128


betrayed their fatherland. However, the South Koreans are not eager to welcome them as freedom seekers in their country. The self-identity among the new citizens of South Korea has weakened by the guilt and disapproval they experience under these circumstances. Unable to adapt to a very different society than the society they had abandoned, many Talbukja have become criminals. More than 50 such cases have been reported. Evidently, their adaptation is not working.


In short, issue of Talbukja has been transformed from a diplomatic one to a social problem in South Korea. In the meantime, the legal question about their nationality has become important. This question is closely related to the Chosonjok and the South Korean governments policy toward them.


Issues Related to the Chosonjok


As noted earlier, the Korean Chinese population has reached almost 2 million. About 200,000 of them are believed to be living in South Korea. Thus, the Chosonjok question is not only a domestic problem for the South Korean government but also a diplomatic issue with China. There are five types of ethnic Koreans in China: Chosonjok, legal and long-term Chokyo, illegal Talbukja , legal and short-term arrivals from North Korean, and South Koreans. As mentioned before, the Chinese government classified ethnic Koreans into two groups in 1957: those who lived in Guannei (China Proper), who were classified as foreigners (Chokyo, literally overseas Koreans) and those ethnic Koreans in Manchuria who became Chinese nationals (Chosonjok in Korean and Chaoxianzu in Chinese) as a part of Chinas minority nationality (shaoshu minzu in Chinese). With this, North Korean defectors are living in China. Another two ethnic Korean groups are the North and South Koreans who are legally working or studying in China. Relations among these groups alarmed the Chinese government and became the basis of Chinas policy toward the Korean Chinese after 1992. Therefore, Korean Chinese migrants in South Korea are not the sole problem for the South Korean government.


Issues related to the Korean Chinese migrants in South Korea can be divided into four parts: (1) the conceptual issue of who the overseas Koreans (Chaewoe Tongpo) are, (2) the legal issue regarding fake marriages between Koreans of different categories, illegal sojourners, and smugglers, (3) the labor issue concerning the trainee employment system and working conditions in South Korea, and (4) the diplomatic issue with the Chinese government. Yet, these four issues are inter-related and affect each other.


The Conceptual Issue: Who are the Overseas Koreans (Chaewoe Tongpo)?40

The question of who are the Overseas Koreans is based on another question, Who are the Korean nationals? The Nationality Act of 1948 after the birth of South Korea provided for three conditions to be a Korean national at birth: (1) ones father was a national of the Republic of Korea, (2) ones mother was a Korean national if ones father is/was unidentified or stateless, and (3) one was born in the Republic of Korea was if both parents were unidentified or stateless. The Nationality Act was most recently amended in 1997 when several provisions were revised to adapt the principle of equality between the sexes.41


The legal problem arose when South Korea established diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union and China, both of which had permitted ethnic Koreans in their territory to become citizens of those countries, respectively. In the case of Korean Chinese, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced the Decision on the Korean People in


129


Yanbian, which stated, the CCP and the Chinese government confirmed that the Koreans in China are a part of the national minorities in China. However, the CCP recognized a special relationship with North Korea in politics, political thought, economics, religion, and family. Therefore, a clear distinction must be made between the Korean minorities (Chaoxianzu) and the overseas Koreans (chaoqiu). A person who has been registered in Yanbian as a Chinese citizen is considered a member of the Korean minority in that autonomous prefecture. An ethnic Korean who was not registered in Yanbian as a Chinese citizen or who came from North Korea after 1945 without permission from the Chinese authorities is regarded as a North Korean national. Although his/her family may reside in North Korea, if the head of the family is living in Yanbian and possesses a house or land, he can apply for Chinese citizenship. Yet, this decision had no real effect because of the outbreak of the Korean War.42 Therefore, the nationality of ethnic Koreans in China was decided in 1957 as explained earlier.


Regarding the Korean Nationality Act,43 depending on when an ethnic Korean living in China or the former Soviet Union acquired his/her citizenship and what type of citizenship the individual had in the host society, South Korean citizenship may be extended to him/her. A person obtaining the citizenship of another country on a voluntary basis loses his/her Korean citizenship. Yet, as noted earlier, most ethnic Koreans in northeast China the acquisition of Chinese citizenship was not voluntary. Moreover, Koreans under Japanese rule who had applied for Chinese citizenship were not allowed to give up their legal status as far as the Japanese government was concerned. Therefore, whether their acquisition of foreign citizenship, Chinese or Japanese, was voluntary is debatable. Also, the acquisition of Chinese citizenship by ethnic Koreans happened before the Korean Act of Nationality.44 Therefore, the question of their citizenship before 1948 is a complicated matter and the South Korean government has so far evaded the question.45


When Chosonjok started to come to South Korea in the mid-1980s, the South Korean government did not stamp visas on Chinese passports but insisted that Korean Chinese obtain South Korean travel certificates to enter the country. There are two explanations for this policy. One is that there was no formal diplomatic relationship between China and South Korea, and the Chinese government also used the same method, avoiding stamping a visa on Korean visitors passports. Second, the South Korean government regarded the Chosonjok as Korean national or overseas Korean at least, because the travel certificate was usually used as a substitute for a Korean passport. Subsequent developments tend to support the second explanation.


In order to avoid the problem, the Korean government introduced a new system, a nationality adjudication (kukjeok panjeong) procedure,46 which protected the Chosonjok who applied for Korean citizenship until they obtained citizenship. They were legally identified as permanent resident returnees (yeongju kwikukja). The initial purpose of the system was to prevent the Chosonjok from being admitted as aliens. Eligibility was gradually expanded from the descendants of former anti-Japanese independence activists to their spouses, lineal ancestors or descendants. Later, Chosonjok women who were married to Korean farmers were also admitted as permanent resident returnees.47

The situation changed with the normalization of relations between China and South Korea. Korean Chinese apparently were Chinese nationals and aliens in South Korea. Korean Chinese who wished to make money in South Korea were eager to come to South Korea. Presidential candidate Kim Youngsam promised to introduce a new overseas Korean


130


policy, which would allow dual citizenship for Korean Chinese. Following his victory in the election and a heated debate inside his government, Kim Young-sam decided to revise the Nationality Act.48 Here, visa status and relaxing some restrictions such as amount of exchanging foreign money and rights to buy real estates. But, it was the opposition leader Kim Dae-jung who promised a more substantial change during the presidential election campaign. He proposed the establishment of a special Office for the Overseas Koreas (kyopo cheong). He withdrew this idea when he became President. However, his government introduced special legislation granting overseas Koreans, including foreign citizens, certain rights, which were not available to aliens of non-Korean descent. The bill prepared by the Ministry of Justice contained provisions for foreign citizens Korean descent (hangukkye woegukin). It granted almost the same legal privileges to Koreans overseas as in Korea. Unlike other foreign citizens, overseas Koreans were treated as natives in real estate transactions and could even join the national health insurance and get a state pension. The bill faced strong opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFA), which expressed the critical comments of foreign governments on the bill. The ministry criticized the bill on the grounds that it was a narrow -minded approach based on blood relationship. As a result, the bill was changed when it passed.49


The Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (Overseas Koreans Act) of 1998 defines overseas Koreans. There are two categories of overseas Koreans (Chaewoe Tongpo ): Korean nationals overseas (chaewoe kukmin) and Korean compatriots having foreign nationality (haewoe kukjeok tongpo). The former simply means South Korean citizens who are long- term residents in foreign countries. The latter category is subject to debate. The Act defines haewoe kukjeok tongpo as persons who have emigrated abroad after the birth of the Republic of Korea, i.e., 1948, and have relinquished their Korean nationality, their lineal descendants, and persons who emigrated before the birth of the Republic of Korea and had their Korean nationality expressly ascertained before acquiring foreign nationality.50 As shown above, the definition excludes most Chosonjok and Koryoin from the category of haewoe kukjeok tongpo. Therefore, around 2.5 million Koreans in China and the CIS out of 5.65 million ethnic Koreans overseas are denied the considerable freedom in visa status, economic rights, and social benefits, such as health insurance, that the newly defined overseas Koreans enjoy.


Naturally, Chosonjok and NGOs protested against the law. In response, the government took supplementary measures relaxing entry requirements. Some Chosonjok have relatives in South Korea, but most of them do not have or cannot find South Korean relatives. For most Chosonjok, therefore, the industrial trainee regime provides the more accessible entryway into South Korea. As a result, the relaxation of restrictions on visas by relatives in entry qualification did not ease the barrier to entry into South Korea. Now, the NGOs protests are focused in easing the entrance barrier rather than amending the law itself. The National Assembly has decided to put the issue on its agenda.


The Legal Issue: Forged Inter-marriages, Illegal Sojourners and Smugglers


Illegal Korean Chinese sojourners in South Korea are estimated at more than 150,000. Most of them have entered the country as industrial trainees or visitors to relatives but have overstayed their visas. In addition, many sojourners are using various methods to enter the country and stay. Some come with a fake Korean passport, some falsely claim marriage to Korean citizens, and some illegally enter the country via dangerous sea routes.


131


PDF to Word