Diaspora Nationalism: The Case of Ethnic Korean

Nationalities Papers, Vol. 34, No. 2, May 2006

Minority in Kazakhstan and its Lessons from the

Crimean Tatars in Turkey*

Chong Jin Oh

Introduction

A diaspora is a migrant community which crosses borders, retains an ethnic group consciousness and peculiar institutions over extended periods (Cohen, 1997, p. ix). It is an ancient social formation, comprised of people living out of their ancestral homeland, who retain their loyalties toward their co-ethnics and the homeland from which they were forced out (Esman, 1996, p. 317). The Jews were the most ancient and well-known diasporic people. For a long time, "diaspora" meant almost exclusively the Jewish people. Hence diaspora signified a collective trauma, a banishment, where one dreamed of home but lived in exile. However, in recent years other peoples, such as Palestinians, Armenians, Chinese, Tatars, etc., who have settled outside their natal territories but maintain strong collective identities, also have defined themselves as disasporas. As Cohen states, "the description or self-description of such groups as diasporas is now common," which allows a certain degree of social distance to displace a high degree of psychological alienation. Accordingly, during the last decades, disaspora has been rediscovered and expanded to include refugees, gastarbei-ters, migrants, expatriates, expellees, political refugees, and ethnic minorities (Safran, 1991, p. 83).

Although ideas concerning diaspora and its types vary, the concept of diaspora in this study is limited to the following: expatriate communities dispersed from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions; a community which has a collective memory and myth about the homeland including its location, history and achievements; a community which has a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long period of time and based on a sense of distinctiveness; a community which had or has a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at the least or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group; a community that has the possibility of a distinctively creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism.¹ These are crucial factors that distinguish them from any migrant community or ethnic minority. Mere physical dispersion does not automatically connote diaspora; there has to be more, such as an acute memory or image of, or contact with, the homeland.² Moreover, in order to explain relations between expatriate communities and their homelands, this definition

ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/06/020111-19 # 2006 Association for the Study of Nationalities DOI: 10.1080/00905990600617623

CHONG JIN OH

well captures the triadic bases of diaspora: host state, homeland, and diaspora community.

Considering the above mentioned definitions, this paper will use the cases of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey and the Korean ethnic minority in Kazakhstan to explore diaspora nationalism. 3It will explore how the Crimean Tatar and the Korean diaspora preserved their ethnic identity in their host state. Particularly, it will examine how diaspora nationalism took shape but remained hidden by the Crimean Tatars in Turkey. The Crimean Tatar diaspora brought into play the triadic nature of diaspora in Turkey to maintain its identity by asserting that it belongs to both Turkey and Crimea.

By examining the Crimean Tatar diaspora experiences in Turkey, who had longer diaspora experiences than the ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan, this paper tries to discover lessons for the ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan who had similar experiences recently. It should be noted that both the Crimean Tatars and Korean diasporas have many similarities in their tragic histories with their uprooting and mass deportation. Therefore, conceivably, we can foresee future aspects of ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan by examining the century long diaspora experiences of Crimean Tatars in Turkey.

This case study intends to serve a heuristic function. In other words, the case study will be used as an opportunity to learn more about the complexity of the problem studied, and to develop further the existing explanatory framework in order to provide an explanation of the particular case examined. As Harry Eckstein argues, the essence of heuristic case studies is "serving to find out."⁴ Thus, both unique cases, the formation and development of Crimean Tatar and Korean diaspora identity, are worth examining in a comparative perspective; not to look for a model case but as an interesting process to be observed and learned.

In order to understand the issue properly, the first part of the paper will give a brief historical background of the Crimean Tatar and Korean diasporas in their respective host countries, Turkey and Kazakhstan. In the second part, the paper will analyze ethnicity and diaspora nationalism by investigating the main institutions which were founded by Crimean Tatar and Korean diasporas, namely, the associations, foundations, and publications. Moreover, it will examine their cultural and social activities which were to maintain their identity.

The Historical Background of the Crimean Tatar and Korean Diaspora

The 1990s were an important period for both Crimean Tatars in Turkey and ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan. For the Crimean Tatar diaspora it was the period when their identity and organization began to prosper as Turkey has changed its position on the ethnic issue in the republic. However, for the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan, it was a time of new challenge. They have made contact with their homeland, Korea, officially for the first time in history. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has

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underpinned its independence by elaborating nationalizing policies and practices that seek to assert the hegemony of its titular nation.

The nationalistic and contravening policies of Kazakhstan are quite understandable and acceptable considering their demographically divided societies during the nation-building process. Even the Turkish government, during its formation as a republic in 1920s, denied the diverse ethnic character of Turkey's population. The longstanding policy of the Republic of Turkey was to promote on all-embracing and all-inclusive Turkish identity and a sense of national unity among an ethnically heterogeneous population (Oran, 1988; Bezanis, 1994, p. 67). A strong separate identity, let alone a political agenda, could not flourish among these groups due to the official policy.

Considering the mentioned above, how Korean and Crimean Tatar diasporas were formed in Kazakhstan and Turkey, respectively, will be examined in this section of the article.

The Formation of the Crimean Tatar Diaspora in Turkey

At a moderate estimate there are about five million Crimean Tatars in Turkey today who trace their origins to the eighteenth and nineteenth century Tatar migrations from the Crimean peninsula (Bezanis, 1994, p. 106). After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Crimean Tatars experienced one of the most heavy-handed policies of Russi-fication. The migration was largely the result of a systematic government policy of the Russians (Williams, 2001, p. 227). Thus, for Crimean Tatars, the Ottoman Turkey was the land of the Caliphate, which, as the defender of Muslim interests, was an obvious place of refuge. The vast majority of descendants of the nineteenth century Crimean Tatar migrants to the Ottoman Empire have been Turkified and retain only a passive identification with their former homeland (Williams, 2001, p. 227).⁶ These descendants, along with a large number of refugees from the Balkans, constitute an important part of the demographic nucleus from which the Republic of Turkey emerged.

Another approximately 20,000 Crimean Tatars left the Crimea in 1891-1893, and movement toward Turkey continued until the First World War. As a result, according to Karpat, the number of Crimean Tatars who immigrated to Turkey until 1922 was approximately 1.8 million (Karpat, 1985, p. 66).⁷ These groups were emigres who escaped the Soviet rule in the Crimea. As Kinmh notes, those who migrated before the turn of the twentieth century mostly considered themselves as emigrants while those who migrated afterwards were likely to consider themselves as emigres in Turkey (Kinmh, 1996, p. 164). The turn of the twentieth century, therefore, marked an intellectual turning point for the outlook of Crimean Tatar emigration to Turkey. These emigres included elites, or intellectuals, who had national consciousness and were directly involved in educational and social reform movements in their homeland, the Crimea. It was these emigres who inspired national thought to Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. Indeed, "Crimean Tatar" as a national identification did not exist then.⁸ Crimean Tatar seems to have had a loose Tatar identification in an ethnic

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sense when they have migrated because of their strong Islamic identification. The term Crimean Tatar in today's sense first appeared in the emigre circles in Istanbul in 1910 (Kinmli, 1996, p. 165). So, it was emigres who have contributed to the consolidation of diasporic identity. To sum up, it was emigre nationalism that provided the necessary stimulus for the Crimean Tatar diaspora to develop diaspora nationalism.

Crimean Tatars were dispersed throughout the contemporary Turkish republic largely concentrating in the following provinces: Eskigehir, Ankara, Istanbul, Konya, Bursa, Adana, Bahkesir, Corum, Kiitahya, Edirne, Kirklareli and Tekirdag. As they are Sunnis, they are able to intermarry with ordinary Turks, but in village life they remain very largely endogamous. Consequently, they managed to preserve sociological Crimean Tatar identity through their language, tradition, oral literature and folklore. However, urbanization, intermarriage and most importantly time have largely resulted in the assimilation of the Crimean Tatars into Turkey, which is quite parallel to the situation faced by ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan recently. Indeed, there seems to be an increasing division between those who perceive their identity through a full range of ethnic markers, and those who, like the fashionable young people in the stylish quarters of Istanbul, have become so immersed in Westernized Mediterranean culture that their local identity has been reduced to little more than a word. Nevertheless, Tatar villages are still to be found in the provinces mentioned above, which might be a bright aspect for the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey in preserving and developing their identity.¹⁰

The Formation of the Korean Diaspora in Kazakhstan

Today, there are about 500,000 ethnic Koreans living in the former Soviet Union. The largest numbers were living in Uzbekistan (approximately 200,000) and Kazakhstan (approximately 100,000). These people were products of Stalin's harsh policy. The majority of the ethnic Koreans now living in the region are descendants of deportees from the Russian Maritime region and other areas in the Russian Far East. All these ethnic Koreans in the region shared in one way or another such bitter historical experiences as the forced collectivization of agriculture carried out by the Stalinist regime. Koreans had begun to settle in the eastern reaches of the Russian Empire between the Ussuri and Amur rivers after the territory was acquired from China in 1860. The initial settlers were mainly agricultural workers; however, following Japan's annexation of the Korean motherland in 1910, the Korean population was expanded by an influx of political refugees (Yun, 1989, p. 167; Helsinki Watch Report, 1991, p. 27). This ethnic Korean movement to the region continued until 1931 when immigration was halted by the Soviet government. However, natural increase helped bring the population to over 200,000 in 1935 (Gelb, 1995, p. 393). The Koreans living in the Russian Far East in the 1920s and 1930s had developed a strong social group with their own traditions which had great economic, political, social, and cultural potential (An et al., 1997, p. 25).

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The Soviets considered the Koreans as natural allies against Japanese imperialism, but nonetheless remained suspicious of them as Asians. In 1937, the Soviet mass media in the Far East began to raise the question of Japanese espionage in the area and the possible role of Koreans in its spy network (Huttenbach, 1993, p. 65; Kim, 1999, p. 186). As a result, despite their long struggle with Japanese colonialism, all Koreans were accused of spying for the Japanese and forced into exile.¹¹

Between September and December 1937, around 200,000 Koreans living in the Russian Far East were deported in freight trains to Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Helsinki Watch Report, 1991, pp. 27-28). With the deportation in 1937, most Korean language, social and cultural institutions were shut down. During the deportation, thousands of Koreans perished on the way and on the barren steppes. Their hardships did not end when they reached Kazakhstan. During their first year many had to live under the open sky or in temporary shelters made of reed and mud (Gelb, 1995, p. 401). Thus, according to Han Jin, chief editor of the Korean newspaper Koryo Ilbo in Kazakhstan, 40,000 Korean deportees, mostly children and women, died in the first year, especially of typhus and from a lack of familiarity with the soil and climate (Helsinki Watch Report, 1991, p. 29). Regional and local authorities hurried to house, feed, supply and employ the new population--hurried, but in the Soviet sense of the word.

Even though circumstances of migration of the two peoples were different, just like Koreans, many Crimean Tatars died due to unsuitable climate, lack of familiarity with the soil, illness (particularly malaria), and a government ill-prepared to deal with the influx during their relocation in Turkey. So we can easily imagine how much the ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan had suffered.

Among those deportees, according to Kazakhstan's statistics, around 20,789 Korean families making up 98,454 people were settled in Kazakhstan (Kim, 1999, p. 196). Despite the harsh conditions of exile, Koreans succeeded even in the early years in achieving relative prosperity. Korean collective farms gained fame throughout the Soviet Union and dozens of Koreans in Kazakhstan have been decorated as "Heroes of Socialist Labor."

The ethnic Korean way of life in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period was to assimilate into Soviet (Russophone) society. They focused all their efforts on securing a socioeconomic material base. Particularly after the death of Stalin, the ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan began to reestablish their ethnic identity, culture, languages and civil rights.

Due to their education, industriousness, and organizational skill, the Koreans joined the ranks of the leaders of industry, government, and educational institutions.¹² They played a role as a middleman between the Russian and the local people. Today celebrities such as the folk balladeer Iulii Kim and the rock star Viktor Tsoi, who died in a traffic accident and became an underground cult figure, perhaps symbolize the Koreans' success and their assimilation to Russian culture. Despite the ethnic Koreans' remarkable economic and educational advancement, their Russification

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raises the question of a long-term survivability of their culture. Nonetheless, it was in Kazakhstan that Korean theater, Korean newspapers, and Korean pedagogical institutes were relocated, making Kazakhstan the center of Korean intellectual life in the Soviet Union. In reality, for their survival, they had no choice but to assimilate into the environment where they had any connection. However, another historical turning point that had a significant impact on the ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan came after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The independence of the titular nation, Kazakhstan, made ethnic Koreans face with a new historical environment, in which they had to adapt themselves to a new country as an ethnic minority on a totally new different dimension from Soviet times. So in the next part of the paper, ethnicity and nationalism of the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union will be analyzed with the application of the century long Crimean Tatar diaspora experience in Turkey.

Ethnicity and Diaspora Nationalism

As explained earlier, diaspora has a homeland, but at the same time it accepts its new place as home. Diaspora tends to say simply, "I belong to this nation and other nation, my homeland and my host states." Perhaps this might be a paradox that diaspora possesses. In this respect, the Crimean Tatar diaspora brought into play the triadic nature of diaspora in Turkey to maintain its identity by asserting that it belongs to both Turkey and the Crimea. Perhaps this procedure is an interesting process that can give lessons to the Korean disaspora who are in an interim period after their second historical turning point since 1991.

Recently, with urbanization and the tendency to intermarry with local people, Korean diasporas are facing a strong challenge in their assimilation process. Many Koreans worry that these processes will make the young generation fail to keep their own language and cultural knowledge of their forefathers. Thus, it is worth noting how the Crimean Tatar diaspora has managed to maintain their ethnicity and diaspora nationalism in Turkey throughout the centuries. There have been unfounded speculations that the Crimean Tatar diaspora had long been assimilated into the whole Turkish nation until today (see Fisher, 1978; Williams, 2001). However, especially from the first half of the 1980s, many Crimean Tatar solidarity associations and other activities were increasing in Turkey.¹⁴ Moreover, many people are uncovering their ethnicity as Crimean Tatars and registering themselves to Crimean Tatar associations from various places of Turkey recently. This is also an interesting matter to be observed which may suggest certain plans for the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan.

In addition, like the Korean diaspora, which had become an important part of the local economy, growing rice and other crops, the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey were also considered to be an industrious farming people and it is generally recognized

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that wheat cultivation in Turkey was developed by Crimean Tatars. They were known as the "wheat basket" of Turkey (Karpat, 1985, p. 76). Bearing these issues in mind, ethnicity and diaspora nationalism of the Crimean Tatar diaspora and Korean diaspora will be examined in the next section of the article.

Ethnicity and Diaspora Nationalism of Crimean Tatar in Turkey

It has been more than a century since Crimean Tatars became acknowledged as a diaspora in Turkey and currently only 5% of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey express their identity and engage in national activities, largely the elite (Eren, 1998, p. 328). Even though there are about five million Crimean Tatars in Turkey, constituting the most important branch of Crimean diaspora abroad, 15they could not form an all-embracing organization until the end of 1980s, since Turkey, as a host state, did not provide opportunities for the development of diasporic existence. 16Thus the Crimean Tatar diaspora movement largely remained as an elite movement, and could not reach its grassroots and mobilize them sufficiently. However, by the 1990s, as the political system in Turkey had evolved slightly to be permeable about ethnic expression, an emergence of identity politics in the Crimean Tatar diaspora was observed. 1⁷ As the Soviet Union collapsed and Turkey has sought to expand its influence in the former Soviet Muslim States, the Crimean Tatar diaspora, including other former Soviet Muslim diasporas in Turkey, not only preserved their identity and organization but also began to prosper (Bezanis, 1994, p. 90). In general, it could be said that Crimean Tatar organizations in Turkey are in the early stages of consolidating their ties to governmental and non-governmental groups in the republic.

The driving force of these current activities of the Crimean Tatar diaspora is, to be sure, their continuous movement, although nominally sometimes, throughout their diaspora experience in Turkey. Despite the problems Crimean Tatars faced due to lack of funding and cadre, perhaps typical difficulties associated with emigre or diaspora life, their organs published very interesting and useful material. The necrologies and short memoirs alone are indispensable for reconstructing the activities of these groups in Turkey.

As mentioned in the previous section, it was shortly after 1905 when a distinctive Crimean Tatar national identity, with its unique allegiances and affiliations, was formed (Kinmh, 1996, p. ix).¹⁸ Kinmh argues, "this period was the critical transitional period in the evolutionary process from a disintegrating traditional Muslim society to a nation defined in modern terms." But this doesn't mean that Crimean Tatars before 1905 had no group solidarity. Although the Crimean Tatar diaspora in the Ottoman Empire was late in nationalist awakening, they had a sense of belonging by their diaspora allegiances since the beginning of migration. They somehow managed to preserve their cultural consciousness and traditional folk culture (Ulkiisal, 1966, p. 251).

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The first diaspora organization, the Tatar Charitable Society (Tatar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi), was founded in Istanbul in 1908 (Kinmli, 1996, p. 162). The primary purpose of the Society was to promote education and mutual assistance among the Crimean Tatar immigrants. According to Kinmli, the Tatar Charitable Society prompted a "quasi-historical" and "cultural Tatar" transplanted into contemporary Turkey (Kinmli, 1996, p. 164). Most of its members were intellectuals who considered themselves as emigres in Turkey rather than as immigrants. On this account, one may argue that these emigres played a bridging role to carry this nationalist thought to the current Turkish republic.

It was during this period that Crimean Tatars, particularly by Crimean Tatar students in Istanbul, identified themselves as "Tatars" for their principal basis of national self-identification. Actually, the term Tatar was used by the Russians and Ottomans to connote Turkic-Muslim people from the Russian Empire. However, Crimean Tatar students adhered to the term Tatar in their identity formation (Kinmer, 1961, p. 38; Kinmli, 1996, p. 165). Also, the concept of the "Tatar Fatherland" was passionately promoted by the leading members of the Crimean Tatar students and emigres.¹⁹ As Turkish nationalists, the Young Turks accepted Turkish or Pan-Turkic ethnicity as a basis for the forming of a nation--rejecting Sultan Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamism and Ottomanism--and Crimean Tatars began to think of their own people in ethno-political terms adopting the Young Turks' idea (Williams, 2001, p. 249). The fact that Crimean Tatars in Turkey identified themselves as Tatar, which recognizes them as a separate community, contributed the consolidation of the diasporic identity. What's more, two diaspora newspapers, Tongug (First Born) and Qolpan (Venus), were published in Turkey during this time. The very existence of such organizations and papers shows that Crimean Tatars had integrated, but not completely assimilated to the host society. Perhaps this is quite parallel to Korean diaspora situation during the Soviet times.

The period of diasporic nationalist activity in Turkey, however, came to an abrupt end with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Establishing the Turkish Republic on the ruins of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire made President Kemal Ataturk, founder of Republic, forge a united Turkish nation on its territory that was far from homogenous. The new Turkish secularist nation-state did not recognize the diverse ethnic background of its people. Atattirk's Turkey gave no permission for ethnic identity of small ethnic groups in its school system, the legal system, territorial administration, etc. The government policy throughout the life of the Republic has aimed at the homogenization of the population of Turkey based on Turkish culture and linguistic coordinates (Bezanis, 1994, p. 67).²⁰ The main tools in this process were education and the press. Things in Turkish were lauded while other traditions and languages were carefully downplayed. Similar to the Kazakhstan's situation after its independence in 1991, for Turkey this approach was crucial for its survival and long-term viability of the nation-state. Additionally, we should notice that Turkey was a model for many Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, during their nation-building process.²¹

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The Republic of Turkey identified its citizens only as "Turks" in the state constitution, proclaiming that Tatars, Circassians, Laz, Kurdes, etc. did not exist but Turks did and this extended into all walks of life, including the world of scholarship (Bezanis, 1994, p. 67). In this climate it is not surprising that the Crimean Tatar diaspora felt compelled to demonstrate their allegiance to this new Turkish state by cutting their ties to their previous homeland.²² With the lack of conditions to develop diaspora politics, assimilation seemed inevitable, even to diaspora nationalists. There were no public forums or political venues for the expression of Crimean Tatar identity during the early Republican period in Turkey and this certainly contributed to the gradual breakdown of Crimean Tatar identity witnessed by Fisher in the 1970s (Fisher, 1979, p. 15). Thus, many Crimean Tatars in Turkey became generally comfortable with identifying themselves as simply Turkish. However, the minority of Crimean Tatars in Turkey, who continued to identify politically or emotionally with their kin in the Crimean homeland, have tended to call themselves Crimean Turks (Kirim Turkleri) to stress their loyalty to the idea of Turkey and their own Turkic roots.²³ There were also government pressures to call themselves Crimean Turks. According to Bezanis, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) warned the Crimean Tatars of Turkey to use the term "Turk" and not "Tatar" in their publications (Bezanis, 1994, p. 81). So it seems that sticking to an identification with the name Crimean Turk became the solution.

As stated earlier, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Turkish president Turgut Ozal's burst of interest in the "Outer Turks" (i.e. Tatars, Turkmens, Kazaks, Uzbeks, etc.) official Turkey's attitude towards the Crimean Tatars began to change. The subject of the Crimean Tatars and other Turkic groups was no longer a taboo in the Turkish republic and Turkey proclaimed itself as the "morning star" rising to guide the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union into a prosperous new era (Williams, 2001, p. 260). Many Turkish leaders visited Crimea to show their support for the Crimean Tatars during the 1990s. Consequently, the dogmas of old are slowly being questioned and revised. Self-designation is a simple barometer of this. The term "Crimean Tatar" is used today among many young activists. These new generations of Crimean Tatars have disregarded the term "Crimean Turk" and are actively calling themselves Crimean Tatar. Hakan Kinmli, an activist himself, states that this is a very crucial development in order to form a united diaspora activity and common identity among Crimean Tatars. He argues that since the homeland compatriots and other Crimean Tatar diasporas are designating them as "Crimean Tatar," it is essential to unify the terms into a single form, "Crimean Tatar." Moreover, he contends that the diaspora activity should be linked to and cooperate with the homeland in order not to assimilate and disappear in the host state.²⁴

By referring to themselves as "Crimean Tatars," which is the same self-designation used by their homeland compatriots, the Crimean diaspora in Turkey are rediscovering their Crimean heritage. It has helped to awaken and mobilize the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. Perhaps this suggests a good lesson to the Koreans who use different

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self-designations between the homeland and the host state. While Koreans in the Korean peninsula indicate themselves ethnically as Han-Min Jok, they do not seem to extend this term to the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan (and other CIS regions as well). Besides, the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan are referring to them as "Koryo Saram." Although German Kim, a Korean diaspora scholar, argues the term "Koryo saram" is appropriate for their designation since they had different experiences during the last decades (Kim, 2000, 2003), it seems that this will estrange the diapora from the homeland compatriots rather than bringing them together. This will not lead to the recovery of their divergent culture. As German Kim notes, truly, there are substantial cultural differences between the two peoples (Kim, 2000, 2003). Many members of the Korean diaspora have been Russified during the past decades. However, this does not mean that one has to discriminate the Korean diaspora from the homeland Koreans. As Kinmli notes, this is a tragedy that one has to get over. But as German Kim pointed out, recovering the cultural and, to some extent, language difference should not be a lopsided imposition of South Korean culture. As their dissimilation was a process that occurred over decades, their assimilation will also take time. Perhaps, as seen from the Crimean Tatar case, a common designation between the disapora and the homeland compatriots seems to be the starting point to narrow the gap between them.

Due to the laws of governing associations in Turkey, it was hard for the Crimean Tatar diaspora to establish their association during the republican era. Like all such associations in Turkey, they may be closed down and their assets seized upon orders of the police or municipal authorities. Hence, for reasons of prestige and in order to protect themselves, the Crimean Tatar diaspora created a foundation (vakif) (Bezanis, 1994, pp. 69-70).²⁵ Historically and from a legal standpoint the vakif is a more august institution than the association. It cannot be closed with a trial. To establish such a vakif, a financial hurdle must be surpassed and an educational or social purpose should be demonstrated. However, by doing so, Crimean Tatars could prevent the arbitrary seizure of their association assets by transferring them to the vakif²⁶ It is important to notice that only the Crimean Tatars and Azeri were able to maintain a single organ over more than a 30 year period (Bezanis, 1994, p. 71).

Another chief activity of the Crimean Tatar diaspora was publishing, which guided the diaspora nationalism as a movement. Cafer Seydahmet, an emigre politician and the great leader of Crimean diaspora nationalism, started to publish the journal Emel (Aspiration) in Dobruca (a previous Ottoman territory by then belonging to Romania) in 1930. Later it was directed by Miistecip Ulkiisal, also an emigre politician, in Turkey. Although Emel was at first a Turkic nationalist (Pan-Turkist) journal of the Crimean Tatar immigrants in Dobruca, mainly concerning the conditions and rights of the Crimean Tatars in Dobruca, Cafer Seydahmet urged it to become the official organ of the Crimean Tatar national cause. Emel not only fostered the publication of scholarly and all kinds of work and manuscripts about the common culture and history about the Crimean Tatars, but also directed the coordination of the

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activities in diaspora. Thus, Emel symbolized a single path of diaspora nationalism. In fact, Emel describes the 40 years of diaspora nationalist movement very well, and deserves to be a subject of study itself alone.

By 1983 Emel was transferred to a new cadre as the old veterans were aging.²⁷ This was a transition to a newly emerging Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism. The editorials of Emel started to be written together by Hakan Kinmh²⁸ and Zafer Karatay. 29The first thing that the new cadre did was to color the cover of Emel in the azure color of the Crimean Tatar flag, and put a Crimean map on it. Second, they advertised the journal, using the phrase of "The Voice of Crimean Turks." The old cadre saw these acts as too provocative vis-a-vis the Turkish official sensitivities. Today, Emel and other Crimean Tatar diaspora publications show the ways in which young Crimean Tatars are encouraged to identify with the Crimea as their sole homeland. The articles from the journal clearly demonstrate the Crimean Tatars' conceptualization of themselves as a diaspora and their growing links to both the Crimea and their own past. Emel contributed to the increase of Crimean Tatar diaspora associations after 1990.

Recently, all the activities have been centered by the "Main Center of Cultural and Aid Associations of the Crimean Turks" (Kirim Tiirkleri Kultur ve Yardimlasma Dernegi Genel Merkezi), headed by Dr. Ahmet Disan Kinmh. He is the leading figure in the Turkish diaspora at the moment. As a former Minister of Tourism in Turkey connected with the old Democratic Party and Justice Party, he has succeeded in having his organization recognized as a state-recognized charity in Turkey, so that it was able to raise some governmental support, has advantageous taxation, and invests theses for the welfare of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea. Today, some 25 local associations have accepted work under the Main Center; the others remain independent, though they make certain alliances among themselves.

Crimean Tatar organizations are currently multiplying in Turkey and, with the Turkish government's relaxation of its policy of Atatiirkism, there may be new public and political venues for the expression of Crimean Tatar ethnicity in Republican Turkey. Thus, first politicization is needed to transfer a diaspora consciousness into a national identity politics. This politicization of the Turkish diaspora's identity will certainly benefit the Crimean Tatar struggle in the homeland and may help prevent assimilation in Turkey. What Kinmh calls "partial-assimilation" actually points out the existence of diaspora. Diaspora is culturally, not to mention ethnically, hybrid. Therefore, those Crimean diasporas in Turkey were Crimean Tatars and at the same time full-fledged Turkish citizens.³¹

The Case of Ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan

As we discussed in the previous section, the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan had undergone ruthless and massive social, economic, and cultural transformation under Soviet rule. The result of this process was one of the most Sovietized and Russified

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nations in all the Soviet Union. Compared to other ethnic groups the Koreans are well educated, but in Russian. Today, about 400 Koreans are said to have doctoral degrees (including Kandidatskaya) in Kazakhstan working for various universities and institutes.³² However, this educational advancement meant that many Koreans lost their own language. According to the latest census, more than half of all Koreans do not regard Korean as their mother tongue.

As Simon notes, this assimilation probably represented as more profound a long-term threat to the survival of small peoples than the mishandling some of them received during the 1930s and 1940s (Simon, 1991, pp. 315-333). Nevertheless, there was strong awareness of a specifically Korean identity, even if this was based more in self-perception rather than in identifiable cultural indicators (Gelb, 1995, pp. 410-411; Back, 2001). Many traditional customs, celebrations, and cuisine still survive. Efforts are now underway to expand cultural and economic ties with the two Koreas, especially South Korea.

During the Perestroika period, the Korean diaspora actively lobbied to develop their national customs, traditions, language and culture. They tried to create a cultural autonomy among Kazakhstan's multi-ethnic population. However, after the Kazakhstans' independence in 1991, Kazak nationalism emerged as a strong social force in Kazakhstani society. It had a crucial impact on the domestic and international politics of the new Kazak state. Consequently, Kazak nationalism played a critical role in the current Korean diaspora matter.

Kazakhstani patriotism as an official means of social consolidation was introduced by President Nazarbayev. According to Sarsembayev, Kazakfication is an idea of creating the dominance of ethnic Kazaks in the economic, cultural, educational, and political spheres of independent Kazakhstan (Sarsembayev, 1999, p. 331). Even though the Kazakhstani policy claimed on paper that "Kazakhstan of 2030 would be inhabited by representatives of numerous nationalities sure of equal opportunities enjoyed by all the nations but considering themselves to be citizens of Kazakhstan, first and foremost" (Nazarbayev, 1997), many political elite have actually recognized

TABLE 1 Daily languages spoken by Korean diaspora by age

(%)	10s	20s	30s	Over 40s
Korean	1	0	5	9
Russian	98	98	93	91
Kazak	0	0	0	0
Unanswered	1	2	2	0

Source: Kim Sang Cheol and Im Young Sang, "Jung-ang Asia jee-yuk 3, 4 Saedae Koryo-in u-shik-kwa Seng-hwal Munwha Byeon-wha," Project Paper, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2001.

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TABLE 2 Korean language skill by age
Listening ability by age Speaking ability by age

(%)	10s	20s	30s	Over 40s	10s	20s	30s	Over 40s
Fluent	1	2	2	5	0	2	1	5
Intermediate	11	25	26	30	8	13	20	23
Understand a little	60	50	52	54	48	50	42	59
Don't understand	26	21	16	10	41	32	33	11
Unanswered	2	2	4	1	3	3	4	2

Source: Kim Sang Cheol and Kim German, "Dong-lip Kuk-ga Yoenhap jee-yuk 3, 4 Saedae Koryo-in Tuk-sung-kwa Seng-hwal Munwha Byeon-wha," Project Paper, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2001.

that this plan does not work in practice (Sarsembayev, 1999, p. 332). Thus, the failure of this idea leaves only one option: the creation of an ethnocratic state dominated by the Kazaks within the framework of a multi-ethnic society of equal socioeconomic opportunities. It is the Kazak population that eventually demands and supports the Presidential team in its pursuit of Kazakfication in the hope of gaining privileges at the expense of other ethnic groups. We can observe this from the state recruitment policy. In 1994, ethnic Kazak were already almost 75% in both the Cabinet of Ministers and Presidential Administration (Galiyev et al., 1994). The 1996 official "Concept for the Forming of a State Identity of the Republic of Kazakhstan" sees Kazakhstan as the only "ethnic center" and statehood of all Kazaks while "non-Kazak ethnic communities" could not attach similarly strong claims to this state since "the majority of them have their own statehood elsewhere" (Kolsto, 1998, pp. 52-55).

This makes quite a difference from the Crimean Tatar diaspora case in Turkey. During the Republican Turkey era, if Crimean Tatars, of course including other ethnic groups, were assimilated in Turkish society they had an equal chance to participate in every field of society. There were numerous Crimean Tatar politicians, generals and MPs in Turkey. However, the atmosphere in Kazakhstan seems different due to the Soviet legacy. In this circumstance, perhaps, the Chinese minority case in Malaysia may suggest one thing. Due to the aggressive indigenization of the educational and administrative system, the Chinese minorities have accommodated to their lesser-than-equal status in gaining access to higher education and government jobs, and maintained their high educational and economic standards by capitalizing upon the opportunities in the private sector (Bhavna, 1996, pp. 55-60). This scheme seems to suit the Kazakfication policy, since Koreans are more commercially minded that they do perform significantly better than Kazak in the economy.³³ Moreover, now the Korean diasporas have a relatively modernized homeland that has the economic means to support them.³⁴ However, as a Korean diaspora scholar, German Kim is concerned about this event, as it might reduce Korean diaspora

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intelligentsias, which will be a great loss of intellectual potential. That is why, as mentioned above, like the Chinese minorities in Malaysia, the Korean diasporas have to maintain their high educational and economic standards by capitalizing upon the opportunities in the private sector.

Fortunately, Kazakhstan today is relatively more democratic than many of its neighboring Central Asian countries, although its democratic process itself, from a Western political perspective, is deeply flawed (Akiner, 1995, p. 30). Moreoever, Nazarbayev himself pointed out that the Kazak leadership has to preserve the stability and the interethnic peace in the country, otherwise, it would be far worse than Yugoslavia (Olcott, 1995, p. 40). Therefore, he has to try to balance the overall situation by satisfying the demands of Kazak nationalists and by placating the Russophone and Russian population. In this respect, the new Constitution of 1995 removed the phrase defining Kazakhstan as "the form of statehood of the self-determining Kazak nation" and the elevation of Russian to the status of an official language, with Kazak remaining as a state language. This has put Kazakhstan as a more favorable place to live in than any other Central Asian States for the Russophone ethnic minorities, including the Korean diaspora.

In this circumstance, the Korean diaspora has to integrate into a new socioeconomic and political landscape. To survive as a unique ethnos in multi-ethnic Kazakhstan, the Korean diaspora should continuously maintain their relations with the homeland, Korea. Unlike the Crimean Tatar diaspora who compose around five million in Turkey, the Korean diaspora is a drop in the ocean. So, relations with the homeland are both materially and spiritually an important support for the revitalizing Korean identity in the host states. As Cohen asserts, the relationship between diasporas and their homelands form a crucial nexus (Cohen, 1997, p. xii). What is more, according to Faist, diasporas do not need concrete social ties to survive. The homeland may well serve as a sufficient symbolic tie to survive (Faist, 2000, pp. 94-102). This is a strong point that the Korean diaspora possesses in comparison to the Crimean Tatar diaspora which doesn't have a proper homeland. Kirmih argues that ethnic consciousness or diaspora nationalism is like a handful of water, in that no matter how hard they try to preserve it, in the course of time it will be drained.³⁵ This is the reason why the contact and continuous relations with the homeland is so crucial. Fresh flows of recruits from the homeland may nourish the migrant community, and help to maintain language and culture. The young generation may visit their homeland to rediscover their roots.

One of the important movements in reestablishing the Korean diaspora's ethnic identity was the "First Annual Congress of the Koreans of Kazakhstan" which took place in Almaty in 1990. At this congress, they founded the "Kazakhstan Republican Association of Korean Cultural Centers." Later, it was renamed as the "Association of the Koreans of Kazakhstan." Many regional level organizations were founded in oblasts and cities. These organizations will be the engine to cultivate diaspora consciousness and ethnicity. The venerable Korean newspaper in Almaty, Koryo Ilbo,³⁶

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also plays a critical role for the survival of genuine Korean ethnicity in Kazakhstan. Moreover, Korean-language radio and television broadcasts are traveling the airwaves of Kazakhstan. 3⁷ In this respect, compared to Crimean Tatars in Turkey, there are many advantages to mobilize the diaspora movement into one figure. Recently, many seminars and lectures on Korean culture and language have been increasing.

Conclusion

Diaspora nationalism is different from the nationalist movement in the homeland. Because of the host state's political situation, politicizing the diaspora movement is not easy. Particularly during the nation-building process, it is hard to mobilize the diaspora movement. In this respect, the Crimean Tatar diaspora during the 1920s and the Korean disapora after 1991 were similar cases. Both host countries were demographi-cally divided, thus titular identity and national unity were promoted among ethnically heterogeneous populations. Lacking in the proper conditions to develop diaspora politics, assimilation seemed inevitable. However, despite centuries of assimilation, it is worth noting that the Crimean Tatar diaspora has managed to perpetuate their ethnicity and diaspora nationalism. And when the progressive liberalization was apparent in Turkish political life after the mid 1980s, particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatar solidarity associations were increased and the diaspora movement became very vigorous. Many people uncovered their ethnicity as Crimean Tatars and registered themselves to the associations.

I would argue that the driving force of these current activities of the Crimean Tatar diaspora is continuous movement throughout their diaspora experience in Turkey. Even though sometimes they were nominal activities, generally an elite movement, the Crimean Tatar diaspora managed to maintain their activities. Even if currently 5% of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey express their identity and engage in diaspora activities, in numbers they are 250,000 people, which is not a small figure. Thus, this suggests an important lesson to the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan: how important the unbroken diaspora movement is in order to preserve their identity and ethnicity in the host state over the century.

To repeat, the nature of a diaspora is a people who have a homeland, but at the same time accept a new place as home. The Crimean Tatar diaspora brought into play the triadic nature of diaspora in Turkey to maintain their identity, by asserting that it belongs to both Turkey and the Crimea. In fact, at the end, the Korean diaspora has to integrate into socioeconomic and political life in Kazakhstan. But this doesn't mean full assimilation into the society and giving up their ethnicity and identity. Full assimilation will raise the question of the long-term survivability of Korean diaspora. "Partial-assimilation" actually points out the existence of diaspora. Diaspora is culturally, not to mention ethnically, hybrid. Therefore, we have to acknowledge that the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan are Koreans and at the same time Kazakhstani citizens.

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Recent urbanization and intermarriage are perhaps seen as big challenges in reducing ethnic identity, both for the Crimean Tatar and Korean diasporas. However, in the age of globalization these are not important matters. One can find lots of Westernized youngsters in their homeland. Many fashionable young people in the stylish quarters of Istanbul or Seoul are indifferent to their native cultures and customs. This points out the important role of the "Main Center for Cultural and Aid Associations of the Crimean Turks" and "Association of the Koreans of Kazakhstan." They are the engines of developing diaspora consciousness and preserving ethnic identity in the host states. However, these associations have limitations in supporting such activities due to lack of funding and cadre. Thus, diaspora activity should be linked to and cooperate with the homeland. Fortunately, unlike the Crimean Tatar, the Korean diaspora has a homeland that can support these activities. But we should remind ourselves again that supporting doesn't mean imposing the homeland's culture and language unilaterally. As I mentioned, diaspora nationalism is based on a triadic relationship between the homeland, host state/society and the diaspora community, which creates its transnational and hybrid structure.

The Crimean Tatar and Korean diasporas had a similar tragic history: both were uprooted from their homeland. Nonetheless, after the long separation, during the 1990s they had made a contact with their homeland. It was a critical historic event, since diaspora nationalism (or ethnic identity among diaspora) is "like a handful of water." In order to preserve them they need to have a continuous supply of the fresh water from a riverhead. To be sure, it is not an easy task. No matter how tough the journey is, I would say, it is the Crimean Tatars' and Koreans' destiny to be involved with the issue for the sake of their prosperity in the future.

NOTES

* I would like to thank the Scientific and Technical Reserach Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), whose financial help enabled me to conduct this research.

-- For a list of features of a diaspora, see Cohen (1997, p. 26).

-- On the issue William Safran, Milton Esman, and Gabriel Sheffer give in-depth analysis.

-- Before using them as a case, it should be noted that unlike the Korean diaspora, the
Crimean Tatar does not have an independent homeland, which makes the difference
between them in forming diaspora nationalism and their activity. Additionally, the
Crimean Tatars are ethnically not totally alien to their host states vis-a-vis the Korean dia
spora in Kazakhstan.

-- According to Harry Eckstein, the heuristic case study is used as a means of stimulating the
imagination in order to discern important new general problems, identify possible theoreti
cal solutions, and formulate potentially generalizable relations that were not previously
apparent. For more information about heuristic case study, see Harry Eckstein, "Case
Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds, Hand
book of Political Science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 99-103.

-- There are also smaller Crimean Tatar diaspora enclaves in Romania (40,000) and Bulgaria
(20,000), Uzbekistan (500,000), Germany (not yet estimated), and the United States (80,000).

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-- The number of activists in this groups are estimated to be a couple of thousand at most and
do not number in the millions.

-- The entire remaining Crimean Tatars were deported by the Soviet authorities to Central
Asia, mostly to Uzbekistan in the name of treason against the Soviet Union, which is
quite similar to the ethnic Korean experience in Kazakhstan.

-- It is important to note that in the non-Western societies "nationalism" is something that is
imported from the West. Thus, we cannot expect Crimean Tatar diaspora to develop
nationalism before it was imported in the society.

-- Private interview with Dr. Hakan Kinmli in Ankara, 11 September 2003.

-- Recently the author has been working on a large project concerning the Crimean Tatar vil
lages in Turkey with Dr. Kinmli.

-- German Kim notes that Koreans were used as pawns in the Soviet's geopolitics in the Far
East and Asia-Pacific in general.

-- By the 1970s, the number of university graduates was about twice that of the general popu
lation. See Gelb (1995, p. 409); Helsinki Watch Report (1991, p. 28); Kan (1995); and
Kim, G. N. i D. V. Men, Istoriia i kul'tura koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Ghylym, 1995).

-- For the intermarriage issue see Kim, "Almaty-si Koryo-in-dul-u Minjok-gan-u Gyol-hon
Munjae" joint project paper, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2001.

-- Associations increased from three to over thirty, and three foundations and one institute
were established. Two major journals and many bulletins were being published by these
organizations.

-- The branch of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey is accepted as the most important branch
of diaspora by diaspora nationalists; for more information, see Kinm, Vol. 23 (1998), p. 1.

-- These circumstances can be attributed to natural assimilation processes over several gen
erations and the longstanding policy of Turkey to promote a Turkish identity and sense of
national unity among an ethnically heterogeneous population. Quite similar to what ethnic
Koreans are experiencing in Kazakhstan since 1990.

-- The subdued pulse of these groups has increased due to Turkish domestic and international
developments. The progressive liberalization apparent in Turkish political life and growing
willingness to accept, even applaud, the multi-ethnic character of nation is crucial in this
progress (Bezanis, 1994, p. 84).

-- The Tatar Charitable Society opened branches in those locations in Anatolia which had
considerable Crimean Tatar diaspora, such as Bandirma, Eski§ehir, and some other towns.

-- Members of this group later played a critical role in the diaspora movement in Turkey, e.g.
Cafer Seydahmet (the exile Crimean Tatar minister), Miistecip Ulkiisal, Edige Kinmal.

-- For example, children were long encouraged to believe that speaking a foreign language in
public was unpatriotic. The military service also helped build a Turkish national conscious
ness in successive young generations.

-- For more information on the matter, see Zbigniew (1997, pp. 130-148).

-- Moreover, it is important to notice that Stalin was in power, thus making it hard for
Crimean Tatars to have contact with their homeland.

-- However, the branches of diaspora in other countries continued their "Tatar" identification.

-- Private interview with Dr. Hakan Kinmli in Ankara, 11 September 2003.

-- For more information also, see Aktas. (1987).

-- Since Kazakhstan is a Turkic country which shares many similarities with Turkey, this may
suggest an idea to the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan.

-- Emel was one of the two diaspora journals which was not closed during the 1980 military coup.

-- Hakan Kinmli is a Crimean Tatar born in Turkey. He received his Ph.D. from the Univer
sity of Wisconsin and published a book, National Movements and National Identity among

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the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1916 (1996). Currently he teaches in Bilkent University, Ankara. He is at the same time one of the main diaspora activists related with Emel and the Main Center for Cultural and Aid Associations of the Crimean Turks (Kinm Tiirkleri Kulttir ve Yardimla§ma Dernegi Genel Merkezi), along with his father, A. Ihsan Kirimli. He was a representative of the Crimean Tatar National Movement Organization in the Crimea to Turkey for a period.

-- Zafer Karatay is a Crimean Tatar born in Ankara, in 1958. He graduated from Gazi Uni
versity's Engineering and Architecture Department. Since 1986 he has been working as a
producer in TRT (Turkish National Television) producing various documentary programs.
He was an activist in Emel as an editor. He published many articles about the Crimean
Tatars in various newspapers and journals in Turkey. He was a representative of the
Crimean Tatar National Movement Organization in the Crimea.

-- Private interview with Hakan Kirimli in Ankara, 11 September 2003.

-- For more detail information, see An et al. (1997, pp. 156-157).

-- Kim notes Koreans in America who made great progress in business, in science, and later
even in politics. He mentions the historical experience of the Korean diaspora who generally
showed a special ability to adapt to new ecological, economic and socio-cultural conditions.
Private interview with German Kim in Almaty, 4 August 2003. On the issue see Kim (1999).

-- Recently, there has been much research on constructing a network of ethnic Koreans in CIS
countries, including Central Asian countries, with South Korea by Korean scholars. This
kind of research will give many ideas to the Korean diaspora and Korean government
for more systematical backing. For more information, see Lim Young Sang (2001).

-- Private interview with Hakan Kirimli in Ankara, 11 September 2003.

-- It was first issued in 1938 in the name of Lenin Kichi (Lenin's Banner) and was renamed as
Koryo Ilbo in 1991.

-- Even though the audience is limited, such facilities will play an important role to organize
the diaspora movement when the time has come, just as the Crimean Tatar journal has
played in Turkey. Although the Crimean Tatar journal has existed nominally sometimes,
it played a critical role after the mid 1980s.

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Diaspora Nationalism: The Case of Ethnic Korean