Georgy Toloraya, Research Director of The Center for Contemporary Korean Studies, IMEMO, Moscow
It seems that the U.S. media has successfully indoctrinated much of the public, as well as a remarkable part of the world's political establishment, with the idea that the "aggressive and unpredictable North Korean dictator," Kim long 11, has destabilized the Korean peninsula with his desire to accumulate nuclear weapons, in addition to his million -strong army. The proponents of the above perception believe that Kim's goal is to threaten his neighboring countries and, if possible, conquer the prosperous South. This perception is strengthened by the fact that his father, Kim 11 Sung, pursued this very same objective in the 1950s. This argument immediately suggests a solution, which is to use all means possible, even force, to permanently remove any nuclear, chemical or bio- logical weapons from this dangerous adventurer and blackmailer.
To all initial appearances, this solution may seem logical and practical. But what is to be done afterwards? Is it possible to allow the dictator to continue to rule after his arsenal of weapons has been removed? Well, if we follow the logic now being practiced by the U.S. in Iraq, that would be a half measure. A totalitarian regime, even if it is brought to its knees, is simply no good: the world must be freed from the danger of such threats resurfacing again in the future, while the oppressed subjects should be granted liberty and democracy. However, this will prove to be a more involved process than simply replacing the vanquished North Korean regime with a friendly government; North Korean statehood would probably cease to exist and the reunification of North and South Korea is the only possibility. However, those wishing to go this far to eliminate the state of Juche are totally convinced that the Korean peninsula will thereupon be enjoying peace and serenity.
Those who proffer such "unsophisticated remedies" blithely ignore the fact that following WWII a united (although throughout the history torn apart by internal contradictions) Korean nation gave birth not just to two states, but to two distinct civilizations as well. The modern northern and southern Korean regions share only a small percentage of similarities; the remaining part is alien and beyond each other's comprehension. Therefore, many questions need to be answered: Are the twenty million inhabitants of North Korea ready to accept radical changes in their lives? Can one count on their being suddenly obedient to their southern "masters"? Is South Korea prepared to bear the responsibility for their destinies, which would prove to be exorbitantly expensive? Finally, how will such a scenario affect the international security of this volatile region where the interests of the United States, Japan, China and Russia clash?
The North Korean "nuclear crisis" which captured headline news in the fall of 2002, proves that there are no easy ways to undo the sophisticated knot which has been made only tighter through many circumstances: Korea's ideological and physical separation, the half century of confrontation between the communist and capitalist ideologies and the inherent animosity between the U.S. and North Korea. So before we start undoing this intricate garment by tugging at the nuclear strings, we must provide an answer to the key question: are we for or against the overnight disappearance of North Korea ? This is the final question that underlies the nuclear controversy, and it is the answer to this question which will determine how dramatically the views of the states involved in it diverge.
JUCHE SPECIFICS
What exactly is the North Korea of the early 21st century like? Briefly, it is a country which possesses few natural resources, and operates an archaic, closed economy inside a rigid political regime. This society is structured more along the lines of Confucian feudal traditions and nationalism, rather than purely communist principles. The closed and isolated society still lives by the iron laws of .Stalinism, made even worse by an oriental reverence for those in power who rule the country by anachronistic command methods.
Living under such a system, of course, is probably quite far from being a positive experience. This is due not only to widespread poverty , but also because of the absence of elementary freedoms. For both the people of North Korea and their neighbors it would be more comforting to see a civilized and individual-oriented system in place of the present regime. (However, one should not forget that the Oriental Confucian understanding of personal freedom is narrower than that in the West; this fact is proven by the present examples of .South Korea.) North Korean society is undoubtedly growing weary of its many years of stagnation. It has even given birth to a rather inconspicuous agitation, thus signaling that it may be prepared for modernization if provided with a reasonable course of action.
Does Pyongyang present an immediate threat to its neighbors? The answer seems to be no. First, the thousand-year history of Korea provides no examples of its attempt to conquer other nations. Second, North Korea has no overt reasons for aggression (including attempts to impose its ideology , capture land or economic resources). Nor does it seem to possess the real ability if provided with the opportunity. North Korea's military verbiage and militarization, which seems so striking to the visiting journalists and average Western citizens, are aimed at exerting strict control over society and scaring away potential aggressors whom the top Korean leaders fear so much. Whereas the late Kim 11 Sung, traumatized by his experience of the Korean War (1950-1953), hoped against hope that Korea could be forcefully reunited, Kim Jong Il and his men are more concerned with their own survival. This, however, does not prevent them from probing the possibilities for a future change.
The present impasse will be broken sooner or later, and there are two options for this transition -evolutionary or revolutionary . The evolutionary way, which appeared impossible for the East European communist countries, looks quite probable with North Korea, as it is a country with a bureaucratic monarchial system rather than one based on pure Soviet orthodoxy .It is not too difficult to imagine the North Korean leadership welcoming the creeping privatization of public property. The beneficiaries could be principal state authorities -the leaders of the army and special services, the party bosses, and local civil servants (Kim Jong Il is really interested with Russian experience, with all the radicalism of reforms leaving much of the property in the hands of Soviet-time administrators).
Under such a transition, economic conglomerates would emerge, like the South Korean chaebols, but with a greater government interest in them. By attracting foreign (mostly South Korean) investment and orienting the economy on exports (the low cost of labor in North Korea could make its products very competitive for exports), such conglomerates are capable of forming the basis of the country's economic development. The monarchic absolutist political regime could continue while gradually abandoning its communist verbiage in favor of more nationalist declarations. Such developments cannot bring pros- perity to the working people in North Korea, but they could provide a more decent life, at least without the threat of starvation. The absolute power of the state would be reduced and a transition to a new model would not be accompanied by horrible calamities. In 15 to 20 years Kim Jong Il's heir (who, according to North Korean tradition, is to be nominated now) would inherit an entirely different country , possibly featuring govern- ment-sponsored capitalism and entertaining close economic ties with South Korea. It would be far from a bona fide democracy, but more acceptable to the world community. One or two generations later the reunification of Korea could be on the agenda -initially as a confederation or a union of states and later, as an entity suggested by future developments.
In Washington, however, it seems the decision-makers prefer revolutionary methods which demand some form of external interference. They cannot count on any oppositional allies inside North Korea -any dissident activity in the country is resolutely thwarted. Moreover, any dissent is simply impossible in a country where everyone is shadowed and where there is no reliable information from the outside world. Any attempts at a 'palace revolution' would only incite a more belligerent stance against the rest of the world -power would fall into the hands of even more conservative leaders than Kim Jong Il -or would end in total chaos and an eventual surrender to external forces, which would carry many awful consequences. The revolutionary option would entail the liquidation of the entire government system in North Korea and necessitate a replacement by an occupation administration from South Korea.
South Korea (or at least part of its establishment) may hope for a peaceful occupation, together with the creation of a rigid administrative system over the North Korean population, but Iraqi post-war example shows lots of traps along the way. The Southerners fail to consider the likely alienation of the North Korean population, stemming from both the ideological and traditional discord between the regions, as well as their predictable unwillingness to become second-rate citizens in a united Korea. Numerous civil servants and the military in North Korea will fear possible reprisals at the hands of their new leaders, therefore, an armed guerrilla opposition would be quite possible (the preparations in the North for such a possibility may be well underway), and it would likely win the allegiance of the local population. The many centuries of Korean history provides us with a glimpse of what such a fight would look like: it could realistically continue for many tedious decades in the mountainous terrain and may even derail prosperous South Korea from its respectable position in the global economy.
Philosophically speaking, the enflaming of tensions in the Korean peninsula was provoked by a conflict between the opponents of the evolutionary and the revolutionary approaches. The advantages of the evolutionary option have become apparent for China and Russia, as well as for the Seoul administration of Kim Dae Jung and the Japanese government of Junichiro Koizumi, although the positions of these countries may differ in particulars. However, the President of the U.S., George W. Bush, does not seem prepared to tolerate any "rogue nations. "
WHY DOES KIM JONG IL NEED AN A-BOMB?
Having consolidated his power in the second half of the 1990s, Kim Jong Il began to seek a way out of the impasse his country faced. He could not openly revise his father's legacy (although he did take some encouraging moves, like apologizing to Japan for several kidnapping incidents) nor put at risk the stability of the existing power structure. However, Kim seemed determined to end the isolation of his nation ( Russia played a vital role to help him out of diplomatic blockade) by pledging rapprochement initiatives with the South, as well as normalizing its relations with Japan and the EU. Through other bold domestic initiatives, such as bringing salaries into line with work efficiency and building an "open sector" in the economy, Kim clearly demonstrated where his main interests lay. It is due to these actions that Russian President, Vladimir Putin, dubbed Kim as "a man of modern views," and continued his sup- port for him '- even during Kim's confrontation with the U.S. However, Kim's "modern mindset" did not prevent him from strengthening the country's defenses which would deter his enemies from their attempts to overthrow the regime. True, his interest is to preserve his power and his state. However, evidence would suppose he is not dreaming of "barrack-room socialism," but rather a form of constitutional monarchy, independent and relatively wealthy, such as exists in the Southeast Asian country of Brunei, or an authoritarian regime, like in Malaysia.
Why doesn't such an option, in which Russian diplomacy and Kim Dae Jung's government invested so much effort, appeal to President Bush? Bill Clinton, for one, had init1al plans for a military solution to the nuclear problem but eventually acquired a better understanding of the situation. Eventually, he became a proponent of North Korea's global "involvement." The objections emanating from Bush and his administration probably result more from their animosity toward "the last stronghold of communism. " The White House is probably of the opinion that nothing should assist the current regime in North Korea, despite the fact that there is hope for a positive, yet gradual, change. Or could any rapprochement of the two Koreas jeopardize U.S. strategic interests in Northeast, Asia, including the deterrence of China and the control over Japan? Or do the Americans consider it below them to bargain with "the bad guys? " Kim Jong Il has no chances to be taken for a good guy due to his background, and not least of all to stubbornness of conservative thinking in the US. This is why the U.S. administration did not support Kim's innovations in 2001-2002 and forwarded a strategic decision to combat his regime. It had very little difficulty finding a pretext, and wasted no time in accusing the "rogue nation " of developing weapons of mass destruction. However, it was through the US pressure which caused North Korea to reactivate its nuclear program, thus creating the danger for a nuclear military potential in the region. Russia cannot accept such developments since they threaten the region with the classic domino effect.
Regrettably, North Korea does not rule out the possession of weapons of mass destruction as a means of deterrence, and unfortunately has the same insouciance toward international law concerning WMD as the U.S. hawks have toward international law in general. The events in Yugoslavia and Iraq have convinced the North Korean leadership that they can only rely on themselves. Even before the relations between Moscow and Seoul were normalized in the early 1990s, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was informed that since Pyongyang was denied the support of the Soviet Union it was forced to develop "the means of deterrence". The North Korean nuclear program frozen in 1994 was undoubtedly of a military nature, but it remains unclear as to how successful it was. Many experts in Russia believe that North Korea does not possess the technical and economic capabilities necessary to develop an A- bomb, but North Koreans may think otherwise while pursuing the program and reporting to their leader of its progress.
But in fact has North Korea do not nave a special need (if only a psychological one) for a nuclear deterrent: it possesses enough conventional deterrence weapons capable of inflicting an unacceptable amount of damage to U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, to South Korea itself and to Japan, to prevent an aggression. This is why the 1994 Agreed Framework was particularly beneficial for the North Koreans -in fact, they sold a non-existent product (the U.S. might have entered into the KEDO deal apparently hoping for the collapse of the Korean regime) . The suspected Highly Enriched Uranium program of North Korea provided the US with a valuable opportunity to kill two birds with one stone. First, not to "pay the bill" by accusing the partner of violating the arrangements and terminating the Agreed Framework. Second, to create the necessary prerequisites for regime change should the situation permit.
U.S. PLAN FOR THE CAMPAIGN AND NORTH KOREAN COUNTER-PLAN
In October 2002, U.S. emissary James Kelly accused the North Koreans of secretly buying uranium enrichment equipment. It does not really matter whether intelligence this time was accurate or not: in the opinion of the U. S .administration, the presumption of innocence does not apply to the "axis of evil" countries, and compared to Iraq, North Korea could hardly whitewash its reputation.
Understanding this, Pyongyang embarked on a very dangerous game - it decided to make the Americans nervous and force them into negotiations. North Korea declared that it "can obtain not only nuclear but more powerful weapons" to counter the American threat. The North Koreans counted on the experience they had gained during their contacts with the Clinton administration, which would have begun seeking some sort of a compromise.
However, the North Koreans failed to understand who they were dealing with this time -their position only played into the hands of the "hawks". Although the statement was intentionally ambiguous and apparently propagandistic bluffing, the U .S. took it as North Korea's admission that it is working on a secret nuclear program (there has never been any proof of that), which fur- ther aggravated the situation. The U .S. stopped delivering fuel oil to Korea under the Agreed Framework , while North Korea restarted its plutonium program and withdrew from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
At the same time initially North Koreans openly declared -and called upon Russia and China to be witnesses -that they were prepared to make their nuclear program more transparent and even admit inspectors into the country, provided the U.S. give guarantees of inviolability (suggesting that in this case they will no longer need deterrence weapons). Washington, however, at this stage demonstrated no intentions to issue any guarantees; it declined to enter into negotiations with Pyongyang, despite pressure from Russia, .China, and even Japan and South Korea. Paradoxically, as the crisis unraveled in the end of 2002- early 2003 US showed no marked signs of willingness to learn the truth about the North Korean nuclear program. Instead the US proposed bringing the discussion to the UN with an apparent hope to build a coalition against North Korea when the situation becomes more opportune. The North Koreans interpreted this as the U.S. playing a waiting game until the Iraqi campaign is over and took a new course- not only threatening with creation of nuclear weapons but making practical steps to produce it (it is important in this context that practical actions were taken by DPRK only after it declared walking out of NPT in January 2003).
Only the imminent threat of North Korea going nuclear brought about the start of negotiations in Beijing in April 2003. North Koreans, however, dramatically raised the stakes by declaring on the onset that they already possess the nuclear capability and from now own want to be treated accordingly. The result was the 4 month-long hiatus in the negotiations as Washington had to adjust itself to this new reality. Regardless of the fact whether Kim Jong Il has a nuclear bomb or just bluffing (intentionally or sincerely believing his scientists had achieved success- which is impossible to know without tests) the choice remains essentially the same - use of force to sweep away the regime or compromise with it.
Things will hardly come to war -the potential damage of Pyongyang's retaliation is too great. However, the U.S. is capable of isolating North Korea and choking it economically; especially since Washington can appeal to the world for support as the North Korean moves are provoking international sanctions. US figures, that stripped of humanitarian aid, funds from arms exports and remittances from ethnic Koreans living abroad, the convulsing regime -without raw materials and energy -will eventually collapse and the North will be absorbed by the South. This will take time, but then Washington is in no hurry , as it knows perfectly well that the threat coming from North Korean weapons of mass destruction is only marginal.
Kim Jong II has only two options: either he honorably capitulates or begins a risky game and places the U.S. before the dilemma: either it starts a military conflict or yields and enters into negotiations with North Korea in search of a compromise.
Such a game may have serious consequences. Russia - which up until now has unreservedly supported Pyongyang -may eventually become a hostage of this game. If talks - be it six-party, or bilateral - lead nowhere, he will simply have no choice. And a cornered regime may commit a desperate act.
Peace or war in Korea? An answer to this question will be provided in the next few months. It is critical that Russia and the world community restrain Kim from an irreparable act, on the one hand, and help Bush save face and resolve the issue peacefully, on the other. However, not every dialog will be efficient. North Korea's proposal to abandon weapons of mass destruction in exchange for the guarantees of inviolability will save the status quo in Korea. The current U.S . thinking seems to be aimed at turning up the pressure on Pyongyang through multilateral efforts and eventually changing the status quo. This is unacceptable to Pyongyang, and if the U .S. insists upon its option, the Korean peninsula could be swept away by a conflict which would far exceed the scale of the war on Iraq.